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Abstract
This paper is a contribution to assessing the Swiss energy transition, with an emphasis on the consequences of
decommissioning the nuclear power plants for the electricity market and the whole economy. We expect that
increased renewable generation and demand-side policies of the type already envisioned will not suffice to close
the supply gap, so that Switzerland will have to rely on more imports of electricity, moving away from the export
surpluses realized almost every year since 1910. As this reference scenario is contrary to desired energy security, a
policy scenario is proposed in which net electricity trade is constrained to balance over the year and the supply
gap is closed by relaxing the existing restrictions on gas-fired power plants. One constraint replaces another one, so
that the impacts are not obvious. Furthermore, the prices of electricity and natural gas evolve quite differently
through time and depend on climate and energy policy. We use a modeling framework coupling a detailed
representation of electricity generation and an encompassing representation of the macro-economy to compare
these scenarios in terms of both total system cost and welfare. Both indicators favor the reference scenario without
gas-fired power plants in spite of its higher marginal costs for electricity. The welfare loss of the policy scenario is
small, though, much smaller than the increase in total system cost. This shows that a coupled bottom-up top-down
modeling framework assessing the welfare effect of policies can yield very different results from those of an energy
system model assessing their impact on total system cost.
Keywords: Climate policy, Energy policy, Electricity markets, Technology restrictions, Soft-link coupling, General
equilibrium model, Bottom-up model
1 Introduction
This paper is a contribution to assessing the Swiss en-
ergy transition, like the other articles in this special
issue, but with a different focus. Its emphasis is on the
consequences for the electricity market and the whole
economy of decommissioning the nuclear power plants.
They contributed 31.7% of domestic electricity gener-
ation in 2017, the rest being essentially provided by
hydropower plants (59.6%) (Swiss Federal Office of En-
ergy, 2018). If the nuclear power plants are shut off soon
(we assume that all plants are off the grid by 2035), this
leaves a sizable gap, which cannot be filled by renewable
generation only. The only other plausible candidate for
domestic replacement is gas-fired power generation. Al-
ternatively, more electricity could be imported. Both op-
tions have large downsides. They increase Switzerland’s
energy imports and the first accepts a new source of
large CO2 emissions.
This paper simulates scenarios corresponding to each
option and compares them. Its main innovation is to in-
clude in the scenarios another feature of the Swiss en-
ergy transition—gradual electricity market liberalization.
This calls for a rather detailed representation of the elec-
tricity market, such as only bottom-up models can pro-
vide. At the same time, economy-wide consequences
and impacts on total CO2 emissions are central con-
cerns, which call for a macroeconomic model. Therefore,
a new modeling framework was developed for the pur-
pose of simulating these scenarios, by coupling the dy-
namic TIMES electricity supply model CROSSTEM-CH
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with the dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE)
model GENESwIS. With market liberalization, the coup-
ling of the two models may not rely on the commonly
applied exchange of average costs and prices, but needs
to represent marginal cost pricing on electricity markets
instead. An unexpected outcome of our double-legged
approach is that total system costs and welfare effects
yield quite different assessments of the alternatives. This
result is closely related to mechanisms around marginal
cost pricing and demonstrates the value added by our
coupling approach.
Switzerland, with its energy policy in full transition, is
an interesting case study. The Energy Strategy 2050,
elaborated by the Swiss Federal Council, aims to warrant
an energy supply for Switzerland that is cost-effective,
respectful of the environment, and secure. The policy
focus is on the improvement of energy efficiency and the
promotion of renewables. This focus is planned to be
achieved, from 2020, through market-based policies. The
Swiss electricity market is partly liberalized and to be
further integrated within the larger European market.
Further steps of market liberalization in Switzerland are
being discussed, namely to extend to private households
and small firms the possibility to choose their electricity
supplier.
Following the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011, the
Swiss Federal Council decided to decommission nuclear
power plants at the end of their safe operational lifetime
(the nature and time scale of which is yet to be agreed
upon) without replacing them by newer generation nu-
clear plants. Switzerland has been now accustomed to a
largely CO2-free electricity generation and has vouched
to domestically reduce its total greenhouse gas emissions
by 30% in 2030 compared with 1990.
The Energy Perspectives 2050, commissioned by the
Federal Office of Energy after the 2011 decision to grad-
ually abandon nuclear power, drafted three energy policy
scenarios, resulting in different demand paths, as well as
three electricity supply options to answer electricity de-
mands taking nuclear phase-out into account (Prognos,
2012). These supply options are the following: (1) gas-
fired power plants, (2) gas-fired power plants and renew-
ables, and (3) renewables with the help of electricity im-
ports. Prognos (2012) simulated this set of scenarios
with a bottom-up model performing an “if-then” type of
analysis: Exogenous border conditions on energy prices,
population, and GDP growth drive the model, while the
different policy measures and objectives modify the pos-
sible options and pathways.
Only the direct costs of the energy system were esti-
mated by Prognos in their very detailed bottom-up ap-
proach. Therefore, Ecoplan (2012) was mandated to
assess the economic effects of these scenarios. With their
CGE model, they simulated climate and energy policies
sufficient to attune energy demands and CO2 emissions
with Prognos’ projections and estimated macroeconomic
impacts. All simulations were conducted with the elec-
tricity supply option that includes gas-fired power
plants.
Gas is, in many countries with existing coal-fired
power plants, considered to be an improvement over
coal. However, in Switzerland, gas-fired power plants
would drastically increase CO2 emissions from electricity
generation. These additional emissions would have to be
compensated by stronger efforts in other sectors of the
Swiss economy. Current legislation, mainly the federal
law on the reduction of CO2 emissions (“CO2 Law”),
stipulates that fossil thermal power plants will only be
approved if they fully compensate their CO2 emissions,
of which at least half in the country. This is prohibitive
and keeps Swiss electricity firms from investing in gas-
fired power plants in Switzerland. Instead, they invest in
foreign gas-fired power plants1. For the gas-fired power
plants supply options of the Energy Strategy to
materialize, the domestic compensation condition of the
CO2 Law might have to be relaxed or alleviated through
carbon capture and sequestration.
In order to keep electricity generation CO2-free,
Switzerland could bet on renewables. However, many
economic, administrative, and socio-political barriers are
slowing down their deployment (Swiss Federal Office of
Energy, 2012). Alternatively, Switzerland could rely on
electricity imports from its neighbors. From 1910 until
2004, Switzerland exported more electricity than it
imported. Since then, the balance oscillates in a band of
± 10% of final electricity consumption (Swiss Federal Of-
fice of Energy, 2018). A larger excess of imports would
raise concerns about energy security.
This paper is not the first to examine the conse-
quences of the Swiss nuclear phase-out. Some studies
used bottom-up models (Prognos, 2012; Weidmann,
Kannan, & Turton, 2012), which are, by construction,
very detailed technically but model only partial equilib-
rium. They report variations on total system cost (only
direct costs). Other studies used CGE models, with the
electricity generation production function modified to
yield discrete technological responses (Böhringer, Wick-
art, & Müller, 2003; Bretschger & Zhang, 2017). They
are able to analyze the effects on welfare (Hicks equiva-
lent variation) and the economy as a whole, as well as
changes in the overall excess burden of the tax system.
However, their hybrid representation of electricity gener-
ation options has limited technological detail compared
to rich bottom-up models.
1For example, BKW invested in gas-fired power plants in Italy, and
Alpiq in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Italy.
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In this paper, we combine the bottom-up and top-
down approaches in a single framework called ELEC-
TRA-CH. It was developed specifically to analyze the
Swiss electricity market. It is composed of the dy-
namic TIMES electricity supply model CROSSTEM-
CH and the dynamic CGE model GENESwIS. The
two models are coupled through an iterative soft link
(Drouet et al., 2005; Martinsen, 2011; Rausch &
Mowers, 2014; Schäfer & Jacoby, 2005; Wene, 1996),
which consists in exchanging a chosen set of variables
and solving the models iteratively until convergence
is reached on a given criterion. The technology-rich
CROSSTEM-CH computes cost-efficient electricity
generation, which determines the electricity produc-
tion function and costs for GENESwIS. In turn, GEN-
ESwIS sends back endogenous electricity demands
and factor and intermediate input prices variation
due to general equilibrium effects.
We use this framework to simulate two scenarios
for the replacement of the decommissioned nuclear
power plants, inspired by the supply options of the
Energy Perspectives: (1) a reference scenario that
maintains the restrictions on gas-fired power plants
and accepts large net electricity imports, and (2) a
policy scenario that lifts the restrictions on gas-fired
power plants and bans net electricity imports. The
policy landscape is the same in both scenarios, in-
cluding strengthened market-based energy and cli-
mate policies, liberalization of electricity markets, and
the decommissioning of all nuclear power plants after
50 years of operation.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents
the ELECTRA-CH framework, Section 3 describes the
scenarios, Section 4 discusses the results, and Section 5
concludes.
2 Modeling framework
2.1 The component top-down model GENESwIS
GENESwIS is a dynamic CGE model of the Swiss econ-
omy designed to analyze energy and environmental pol-
icies (Maire, 2016; Maire, Pattupara, Kannan, Vielle, &
Vöhringer, 2015; Vöhringer, 2012). Agents are repre-
sented as rational and forward-looking over the time
horizon 2010–2050. Households maximize their utility
with fixed preferences and a budget constraint. Firms
maximize their profit with fixed production technolo-
gies and perfect competition. The government collects
taxes on income, value-added, mineral oil, CO2, and
electricity and uses the revenues for lump-sum trans-
fers (social benefits) and public goods provision. The
budget is stabilized through adjustment of the income
tax rate, in order to keep public goods provision
constant. Domestic and foreign goods are assumed to
be imperfect substitutes in the Armington (1969)
tradition. Non-satiation in consumption implies that
demand must equal supply in all markets under flex-
ible positive prices.
Capital is modeled as putty-clay in order to repli-
cate the rigid character of investment decisions and
the crowding out of investments. Thus, capital, once
it is invested in one sector (industry, services or elec-
tricity), cannot be transformed into capital for an-
other sector. Investments are treated as exclusively
domestic. Labor supply is flexible given that agents
can choose between labor and leisure, but internationally
immobile.
The energy sector is as disaggregated as necessary for
global energy and environmental policy analysis: electri-
city, natural gas distribution, district heating, refineries,
and three transport sectors (rail, road, other). Fossil en-
ergy carriers are differentiated into nuclear fuel, natural
gas, crude oil (all three only imported), light heating oil,
petrol, and diesel. Nonenergy industries are separated
into aggregates considering their possible importance in
the formation of capital for the electricity sector and
their affiliation to different carbon pricing schemes
(ETS, CO2 tax): agriculture, cement and concrete, con-
struction, metals, other ETS sectors, rest of industry,
and rest of services.
The electricity sector is split into Electricity Gener-
ation and Electricity Transport and Distribution to per-
mit the differentiation between wholesale electricity and
retail electricity prices. Wholesale electricity is either
produced by the Electricity Generation sector or
imported. It is demanded by the Electricity Transport
and Distribution sector or exported. Retail electricity,
transported and distributed, is demanded as an inter-
mediate input and for consumption through three differ-
ent types of uses (appliances, transport, heating), with
demand-side substitution opportunities represented sep-
arately for each of these uses.
The nested CES production technologies, except for
electricity and rail transport, follow a standard KLEM
structure where energy trades off with the factor com-
posite at the second level. The energy nest does not
allow for much substitution between the three differ-
ent types of energy use: transport, appliances, and
heat. However, within these types of energy uses, dif-
ferent fuels or types of production can be substituted
for each other. The transport nest specifies trade-offs
between own transport (including the possibility to
switch to electro-mobility) and the different modes of
transport services. Own transport is constituted of
transport fuels and electro-mobility. The heating nest
is composed of inputs of natural gas, light heating oil,
district heating, and retail electricity. An input from
construction is included to represent the option to re-
duce energy demand for heating through insulation.
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The nesting for energy demand in consumption repli-
cates the same ideas.
For additional information on the GENESwIS compo-
nent model, such as nesting trees, elasticities of substitu-
tion, dynamic calibration, and other data, please consult
Section 2.2 in Maire, Pattupara, et al. (2015).
2.2 The component bottom-up model CROSSTEM-CH
The Cross-Border TIMES Electricity Model CROSSTEM
is a technology-rich dynamic bottom-up optimization
model of the electricity system in Switzerland and its
four neighboring countries, developed in the TIMES
framework. TIMES (Loulou, Goldstein, Remne, Kanudia,
& Lehtila, 2005) is a perfect foresight model in 5-year
time periods that, given a comprehensive set of tech-
nologies, allows users to minimize the cost of the
technology mix over the time horizon, matching a
given demand and considering a set of constraints. It
displays a high level of technological detail, including
operational and maintenance costs, investment costs,
fuel costs, lifetime, construction time, renewable po-
tential, and decommissioning. There are around 200
technologies2 interconnected by more than 60 com-
modities3 to define the whole electricity system. The
technologies in the model include a range of electri-
city power plants, interconnectors for electricity trade
between regions, ad hoc electricity distribution grid,
and storage technologies (pumped hydro storage).
CROSSTEM-CH does not entail subsidies or feed-in
tariffs for renewable technologies.
CROSSTEM (Pattupara & Kannan, 2016) was devel-
oped from the existing STEM-E model described by
Kannan and Turton (2011). It has time slices that reflect
the variability of electricity demand across the day
(hourly), different types of days (weekday, Saturday,
Sunday), and the seasons. Thus, the 8760 h of a year are
represented with 288 representative hours (time slices).
End-use electricity demands in these slices are inelastic
and exogenous. Electricity load curves from the year
2010 are adopted for the entire model horizon. CROSS-
TEM does not model real end-uses (energy useful de-
mands) as some other TIMES models do.
For the analysis in this paper, we use the Swiss module
of the CROSSTEM model—CROSSTEM-CH. Electricity
import and export prices are set exogenously and taken
from the ADAM project (Jordan, Huitema, Van Asselt,
Rayner, & Berkhout, 2010). The model optimizes trade
revenue within the year: importing when it needs to or
when exogenous foreign prices are low and exporting
when prices are high. This has resulted in trade volumes
being equal in the past, and the creation of a positive
trade revenue.
The model is calibrated for 2010. For more detail on
CROSSTEM-CH, see Pattupara (2016) and Loulou et al.
(2005).
2.3 The coupling procedure
2.3.1 General approach and iteration process
For bottom-up top-down coupling, many approaches have
been developed since Hoffman and Jorgenson (1977), each
with its strengths and weaknesses (for a review of the
methods, see e.g., Böhringer & Rutherford, 2009). Few
studies elaborate on the link between costs from bottom-
up models and prices in CGEs. Amongst those that do, as-
sumptions differ, as the following examples show:
 Fortes, Pereira, Pereira, and Seixas (2014) link—as is
most commonly done—total energy costs (average
cost) variation from TIMES to energy prices in a
CGE model.
 Martinsen (2011) links electricity marginal cost
(weighted annual average) from a MARKAL
model to wholesale electricity prices in a
CGE model.
 Riekkola, Berg, Ahlgren, and Söderholm (2013)
link the shadow price (marginal cost) of
electricity from TIMES to the electricity price in
a CGE model.
In our approach, we build on this stream of literature
to model the transition from average to marginal cost
pricing in a gradually liberalizing market. We couple
GENESwIS and CROSSTEM-CH through an automated
iterative soft link. Coupling through soft links allows
keeping the integrity of the models while prioritizing the
strengths of each model to compensate for the short-
comings of the other. Each model is solved iteratively
with input information from the other model until con-
vergence is reached on a given criterion.
Figure 1 depicts the exchange of information between
the two models. Electricity generation costs and their
components as well as export revenues and import costs
are extracted from the CROSSTEM-CH model and
translated for the CGE model into the wholesale electri-
city price and input shares for factors and commodities
in the electricity generation cost function. The sectoral
electricity demand quantities simulated by the GENES-
wIS model are then sent back to become inputs to the
CROSSTEM-CH model. To account for relevant price
and cost changes in the economy, factor and inter-
mediate input prices from GENESwIS are fed to the
2Process technologies in TIMES include a range of technologies, which
are classified into the following groups according to their role in the
energy system: electric power plants (ELE), storage plants (STG), inter-
regional exchange (IRE), demand devices (DMD), renewables (RNW),
mining (MIN), imports/resources (IMP).
3Commodities can also be classified as energy (NRG), emissions
(ENV), demand (DEM), material (MAT), and financial (FIN).
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investment costs and operation and maintenance costs
of the different technologies in the bottom-up model.
This process of data transfer is repeated until the vector
of quantities of total yearly electricity demands con-
verges. It is initiated with a run of CROSSTEM-CH
using baseline electricity demand projections from Prog-
nos (2012) as exogenous input.
In the following subsections, we elaborate on the treat-
ment of the variables to be exchanged between the
models. We also describe the modifications imple-
mented in each model such that they treat the informa-
tion adequately.
2.3.2 CROSSTEM-CH to GENESwIS—input shares and
wholesale electricity price
For information on electricity generation from CROSS-
TEM to be treated as direct input, the electricity gener-
ation production function of GENESwIS is set-up as a
Leontief function. Its cost function can therefore be
written as:
CELE P;Y; tð Þ ¼ YELE tð Þ 
X
t
eqi tð Þ  Pi tð Þ ð1Þ
where YELE(t) is the activity index variable of the elec-
tricity generation production function in period t,
Pi(t) represents the price variables, and ~qi(t) the quan-
tities of the different inputs, indexed by i, entering
electricity generation. Thus, no substitution is allowed
between inputs, within one model run: their value
shares are fixed. The production function for electri-
city generation in GENESwIS is thus determined by
the cost shares optimized by CROSSTEM-CH in each
iteration.
The quantities of the different inputs ~qi(t) are deter-
mined for each iteration4 k, given the costs ~ci(t) from
CROSSTEM-CH, taking into account the input price
levels Pi and the activity index of electricity gener-
ation yELE:
~qiðtÞ ¼
~ciðtÞ
Pi~;k-1ðtÞyELE;k-1ðtÞ
ð2Þ
By calculating input quantities in this way, the whole-
sale electricity price PELE(t) reflects the average cost of
the CROSSTEM-CH model. However, average cost pri-
cing corresponds to a regulated market, whereas the
Swiss and European electricity markets are already partly
liberalized. As we have shown (Maire, Vöhringer, &
Thalmann, 2015), the effectiveness of energy policies
is affected by assumptions about electricity market
liberalization. It is difficult to predict whether and
when all Swiss electricity consumers will be allowed
to choose their supplier freely. We assume a gradual
evolution to full liberalization in 2025. At that point,
the wholesale electricity price will be equal to the
long-term marginal cost computed in the bottom-up
Fig. 1 Information exchange between the two component models
4As prices cannot be fixed in a CGE model, the wholesale electricity
price cannot be plugged directly into the model. However, prices in
the CGE can be pushed to a given value by varying the inputs of the
production function while keeping output constant. As prices and
quantities vary continuously within a CGE run until equilibrium is
reached, present iteration variables cannot be used to determine ~qi(t);
values from the previous iteration must be taken as an approximation.
Although prices at iteration k-1 might differ from prices at iteration k,
once the framework converges, input prices converge as well. Likewise,
as the convergence criterion is set on electricity demand, the
electricity production index YELE(t) is bound to have converged, as
demand always equals supply in a CGE model.
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model5. From 2010 to 2025, the market is in transition
and prices reflect an increasing importance of marginal
cost pricing (see Fig. 2).
Marginal cost pricing in the wholesale market creates
a profit, which provides an incentive for investment into
new capacity. We hence introduce a profit mark-up on
electricity production in the CGE model. The mark-up
is calculated so that the price of wholesale electricity is
pushed from the average cost, AC(t), given by the
CROSSTEM-CH model, to the assumed market price6,
Pm(t):
Profit mark-upðtÞ ¼ PmðtÞ−ACðtÞ
ACðtÞ ð3Þ
Average costs, mark-ups, and wholesale prices are av-
eraged annually, i.e., they represent weighted averages
over the 288 representative time slices of CROSSTEM-
CH per year.
In GENESwIS, all sectors display constant returns to
scale. This is the common assumption in CGE models
that do not explicitly model imperfect competition.
Diminishing returns to scale enter the electricity
generation function of GENESwIS through the coupling
of the models, as the profit in the CGE model is equal
to the producer surplus in the bottom-up model. This
way, the framework considers sub-marginal rents and
income effects from binding constraints in the bottom-up
model. We do not, however, model imperfect competition,
but marginal cost pricing in liberalized markets.
2.3.3 GENESwIS to CROSSTEM-CH—electricity demands and
factor prices
GENESwIS comprehensively simulates economic re-
sponses of firms and households to the policy scenarios
and to the changes in electricity generation technology
and wholesale electricity price provided by the bottom-
up model. The resulting changes in electricity demand
and in factor and commodity prices are passed on to the
bottom-up model. This is done with price-variation co-
efficients7 applied to investment costs and operation and
maintenance costs in CROSSTEM-CH. Fuel costs are set
exogenously for both models, as we model Switzerland as
a small open economy.
Yearly demands from GENESwIS are sent to CROSS-
TEM-CH and divided into the 288 time-slices with the
help of historical load curves. To facilitate convergence,
these electricity demands are sent as Gauss-Seidel com-
binations (Hageman & Young, 1981; Labriet et al., 2010)
of the previous demands. This is shown in Eq. (4), where
D'k is the demand introduced in CROSSTEM-CH in
5The marginal cost in CROSSTEM-CH is the shadow price of the
commodity balance and represents the increase in total system cost
due to an additional unit of demand (Kannan & Turton, 2011). It
reflects all constraints and costs (incl. investment cost) and can
therefore be seen as a long-term marginal cost, or marginal cost
including scarcity rents for capacity. As the CGE model does not
disaggregate the year into 288 time slices, the marginal cost is
aggregated to an annual demand-weighted marginal cost.
6The assumptions on wholesale electricity market prices Pm illustrated
in Fig. 2 are the following: Pm(2010) = historical value; Pm(2015) = 2/
3AC(2015) + 1/3MC(2015); Pm(2020) = 1/3AC(2020) + 2/3MC(2020);
Pm(t>2025) = MC(t).
Fig. 2 Assumptions on market liberalization and implied wholesale electricity market price compared to annual average and marginal costs
7These coefficients are weighted averages of the price variations of the
sectoral outputs and factors of production, with weights equal to the
expenditure shares for each commodity or factor.
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iteration k, and Dk is the demand estimated by the CGE
model in that iteration.
D
0
k ¼ αDk þ 1−αð ÞD
0
k‐1 ð4Þ
The framework is deemed to have converged when
electricity demand changes in the CGE model from one
iteration to the next converge, i.e., when
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃP
t Dk tð Þ−Dk‐1 tð Þð Þ2
q
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃP
tD
2
k tð Þ
q ≤5  10−5 ð5Þ
3 Scenarios
The reference scenario, which we call the NoGAS sce-
nario, maintains the policy restrictions that render gas-
fired power generation uneconomical. Hence, all domes-
tic electricity must be produced with renewables. The
excess of consumption over domestic production is cov-
ered by electricity imports. This corresponds to supply
option E of the Swiss Energy Strategy.
The policy scenario, which we call the GAS scenario,
is inspired by supply option C of the Swiss Energy Strat-
egy, in which electricity trade is constrained to balance
over the year, but the successively decommissioned nu-
clear power plants can be replaced by gas-fired power
plants. To make sure that gas-fired power plants get
built in Switzerland, we have to relax the domestic com-
pensation condition for their CO2 emissions. We assume
that they join the Swiss emissions trading scheme (ETS),
which will be linked to the European ETS.
Both scenarios include the following energy and cli-
mate policies, which are similar to those used in the
other papers of this special issue:
 Nuclear power plants are phased-out at the end
of an assumed lifetime of 50 years and not
replaced by new-generation plants. As a result, no
electricity is produced with nuclear technology
after 2035.
 A tax is introduced on electricity consumption,
amounting to 10% of the electricity retail price in
2020, increasing linearly to 50% in 2050.
 The emission trading scheme (ETS) is linked to the
European ETS. Switzerland is not expected to have a
large impact on CO2 prices, which are thus
exogenous, following projections by Prognos (2012).
 The CO2 tax on natural gas and heating fuels
used by the non-ETS sectors and by households
rises linearly from the existing 36 CHF/t in 2010
to 200 CHF/t in 2050. A share of 250 million
CHF from its revenues is recycled through the
Buildings Program, which subsidizes the energy
refurbishment of buildings.
 A CO2 tax is introduced in 2035 on transport
fuels, starting at 50 CHF/t and rising linearly to
200 CHF/t in 2050.
These policies have the effect that energy-related CO2
emissions decrease by 52% in 2050 relative to 2010 or to
1.9 tons per capita.
4 Results
4.1 Generation costs and technology mix
Between 2019 and 2035, the five nuclear reactors are
taken off the grid one by one. In the short and medium
run, absent subsidies for renewable technologies, the
CROSSTEM-CH model deems more cost-effective to
import electricity rather than invest in expensive re-
newable technologies. By 2045, however, the expected
electricity import prices8 are so high that renewable
technologies such as solar PV and biomass become
competitive.
In the GAS scenario, nuclear generation is replaced by
base and flexible natural gas power plants. The flexible
gas plants are installed to optimize import/export pat-
terns and create maximum trade revenue. By 2050, solar
PV becomes competitive due to technology learning and
increasing natural gas and CO2 prices
9 (Fig. 3a).
The total system cost (Fig. 3b) is noticeably lower for
the reference (NoGAS) scenario than for the GAS sce-
nario. The system saves mostly on variable costs: fuel
cost (natural gas), taxes (CO2 permits), and variable op-
eration and maintenance costs. Despite Switzerland be-
ing a net electricity importer in the NoGAS scenario, the
optimization of trade within the time slices permits the
system to make a net surplus for most of the model
8Trade prices assumptions are specified for the four neighboring
countries: France, Italy, Austria, and Germany. Yearly import prices
are taken from the ADAM project (Jordan et al., 2010). Export prices
are pegged to import prices. Note that the ADAM project does not
build on the same IEA natural gas price projections as this paper, but
a somewhat steeper price trajectory. We prioritized the harmonization
of natural gas prices in CROSSTEM and GENESwIS with a reference
scenario which has widely been used in Switzerland (Prognos, 2012). It
is hardly possible with limited resources to correct ADAM output
such that it would fully reflect our Swiss scenario assumptions.
Consequently, the assumed international electricity trade prices are
based on data, especially for gas prices, that are not fully consistent
with our domestic scenario assumptions. One might advocate that
these inconsistencies are dampened by the technology mix of the
exporting countries, and that time-slice variations of import prices
have a greater impact on technology choices than the average level of
import prices (a description of the determination of time-slice
variations of import prices can be found in Kannan and Turton
(2011)). Notwithstanding, the example of gas prices shows how almost
inevitably data consistency issues arise when different data sources are
used, especially when domestic scenario requirements restrict the
options for adjustments.
9Sources: gas price from International Energy Agency (2010) and CO2
prices following EU-ETS permit prices projections by Prognos (2012).
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horizon (except in 2040). The new gas-fired power
plants of the GAS scenario raise its capital costs above
those of the NoGAS scenario in the early years. This is
reversed in later years, when more renewable capacities
are installed in the NoGAS scenario.
As an aggregate over the whole modeling horizon, the
present value of total system cost, computed with a dis-
count rate of 4.5%, is higher by 4.2 billion CHF2010 in
the GAS scenario than in the NoGAS scenario.
4.2 Electricity costs, prices, and demand
In the short run (2015), the price of imported electri-
city is lower (22.86 CHF2010/GJ) than the marginal
cost of gas-fired power plants (38.4 CHF2010/GJ for
an existing plant, and 28.5 CHF2010/GJ for a new
plant). It is therefore cheaper to import electricity
than to rely on generation by gas-fired power plants.
However, the price of imported electricity is assumed
to rise much faster than that of gas, so that by 2020,
it is comparable to the marginal cost of gas-fired
power plants, and from 2025 onwards, electricity gen-
erated by gas plants is cheaper than imported electri-
city (Fig. 4a). One consequence of the rapidly rising
price of imported electricity is that yearly net electri-
city imports never become larger, in energy units,
than the quantity of natural gas imported for electri-
city generation in the GAS scenario. Thus, the two
scenarios can be considered similar with regard to en-
ergy security, depending on the relative assessment of
supply risks of electricity and natural gas.
Given the assumed high electricity import prices, the
wholesale price of electricity rises less in the GAS sce-
nario than in the NoGAS scenario after 2020 (Fig. 4b).
The electricity price paid by users includes the purchase
of wholesale electricity, transport and distribution costs,
and taxes. The prices of commodities and services
(a)
(b)
Fig. 3 Electricity generation mix and system cost
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needed for transport and distribution are not affected
by the restrictions on gas-fired power plants, and
market-based policies are identical for both scenarios.
Hence, end-user prices vary in the same way as
wholesale electricity prices; however, this variation is
dampened (Fig. 4b).
As an expected consequence of the smaller increase
in end-user electricity price in the GAS scenario rela-
tive to the NoGAS scenario, relative total electricity
demand increases (Fig. 4c). Electricity use for ma-
chines and appliances does not drift as strongly apart
in the two scenarios as it is not easily substituted.
For heating, however, electricity can replace natural
gas, light heating oil, district heating, and better
insulation. Figure 4d shows that CO2 emissions from
light heating oil and natural gas (excluding emissions
from electricity generation) decrease slightly faster in
the GAS scenario as a result of the substitution
towards electricity for heating purposes. The differen-
tials in electricity used and CO2 emitted for trans-
portation are larger, but they may be overestimated,
due to the high elasticity of substitution assumed for
e-mobility in order to replicate the high penetration
projections of Prognos despite a low base year value
share of e-mobility (Prognos, 2012). Altogether, total
fuel-related emissions excluding electricity generation
decrease faster in the GAS scenario and lie about 6%
below those of the reference scenario in 2050.
CO2 emissions from natural gas are naturally much
higher in the GAS scenario than in the reference sce-
nario when the intermediate demand for electricity gen-
eration is included (Fig. 4d, Natural gas incl. elec.). This
has the effect of slowing down the decrease in overall
fuel-related CO2 emissions. These emissions end up 18%
above those of the NoGAS scenario in 2050, but still
43% below 2010.
(a) (b)
(c)
(e)
(d)
Fig. 4 The GAS scenario and NoGAS scenarios compared
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Electricity demand is about 10% higher in the GAS
scenario than in the NoGAS scenario over 2030–2050,
but total system cost is even more increased, so that
the average cost is approximately 9% higher in the
GAS scenario (Fig. 4a).
4.3 Investment
In the coupled framework, the CROSSTEM-CH model
optimizes investment decisions for electricity generation,
which determine yearly capital inputs in the electricity
generation function of GENESwIS. GENESwIS simulates
investment decisions and hence capital accumulation
sufficient to satisfy the demand for capital in the electri-
city sector10. This affects investment and capital forma-
tion for the other sectors (industry and services) through
crowding-out effects.
The GAS scenario with its new power plants requires
more capital for electricity generation than the reference
scenario (Fig. 4e). The impact on total investment is
dampened by the fact that investment for electricity gen-
eration represents less than 2.5% of total investment and
by a crowding-out effect for the other sectors through a
higher relative price of capital. Investment in the indus-
try sectors is more responsive than in services (relative
to their size).
In the NoGAS scenario, the CROSSTEM-CH model
invests about 10 PJ of solar photovoltaics capacity, which
becomes competitive in 2045, instead of only in 2050 in
the GAS scenario. This explains why total investment is
3.4% lower in the GAS scenario than in the NoGAS sce-
nario in 2040, and 2.3% higher in 2045 (Fig. 4e)11.
4.4 Welfare and consumption
Imposing balanced electricity trade hurts the economy,
even if gas-fired power plants are facilitated in compen-
sation. Indeed, welfare is lower by 0.05% or 0.98 billion
CHF2010 in present value in the GAS scenario than in
the NoGAS scenario12. This result was not immediately
predictable, as imported electricity is assumed to get
relatively expensive after 2020. Indeed, the marginal cost
of electricity is higher in the NoGAS scenario than in
the GAS scenario from 2020 on, with a difference of 20
to 30% from 2030 on (Fig. 4a), precisely when con-
sumers pay prices based on marginal costs (Fig. 2). The
resulting lower electricity consumption (Fig. 4c) should
lead to lower welfare in the reference NoGAS scenario.
This reasoning forgets, however, that total energy system
costs are a drain on overall consumption, on which wel-
fare depends. These costs are higher by 4.2 billion
CHF2010 in present value in the GAS scenario. Only
about one fourth of this supplement is due to higher
electricity consumption in the GAS scenario (it is higher
by 5% on average, while total system costs are higher by
19%). This can be seen from the higher average cost for
the GAS scenario (Fig. 4a). Remember also that the in-
vestments in gas-fired power plants crowd out invest-
ment in the rest of the economy.
In short, the variations of total system cost and whole-
sale electricity price in the GAS scenario compared to
the reference NoGAS scenario have opposing effects on
welfare:
1. Lower marginal cost and hence wholesale price for
electricity increases welfare through more electricity
consumption.
2. Higher total system costs due to the fixed costs of
gas-fired power plants lead to lower welfare.
The resulting combination is a loss in welfare, but
much smaller than what would be expected from look-
ing only at the increase in total system cost.
An important condition for this result is that profits
are redistributed lump-sum to the representative house-
hold. Indeed, marginal cost pricing implies substantial
profits (Fig. 5), which are welfare neutral under this as-
sumption. Profits could as well be distributed to foreign
owners or re-invested inefficiently. In Switzerland, the
electricity utilities belong in majority to Swiss municipal-
ities and cantons and contribute to their budgets, so that
lump-sum profit recycling is actually a conservative as-
sumption over the possibility that the profits could be
used for lowering some distortionary tax.
5 Conclusion
This paper compares a policy scenario that leads to
new gas-fired power plants replacing the gradually
decommissioned nuclear power plants with a refer-
ence scenario that fills the virtual supply gap predom-
inantly with electricity imports. Both have technology
restrictions: the reference scenario bans gas-fired
power plants; the policy scenario restricts electricity
imports to not exceed exports in total over the year.
The policy scenario gets the electricity at lower mar-
ginal cost (we assume that imported electricity is
10Capital is modeled as putty-clay, which means that once it is
invested into one sector (industry, services, or electricity), it cannot be
transformed into capital for another sector. Households optimize total
welfare over the whole modeling horizon by choosing between
consumption in a given year or saving to increase their utility at
another time. Utilities of different years can be substituted to each
other through an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.2.
11Such sharp transitions are intrinsic to bottom-up models. They are
transmitted to the top-down model through the coupling.
12Changes in emissions related external effects are not considered in
welfare assessment. They would increase the welfare cost of the GAS
scenario. Consumer utility is higher in the NoGAS scenario in every
year until shortly before 2050. The differential is greatest in 2015–
2020, when imported electricity is still relatively cheap, also because it
allows investment into domestic generation to be deferred to a period
when it is more favorable.
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expensive), but requires substantial investment. If we
focused on marginal costs, neglecting the role of fixed
costs (which crowd out investment in other sectors
and consumption), we would predict that the lower
marginal costs of electricity in the policy scenario
lead to higher household consumption and welfare13.
If we focused instead on total system costs, as is
common when working with energy system models,
we might predict that taking advantage of “investment
free” imports is the cheaper solution. Combining the
two approaches yields an intermediate result: the ref-
erence scenario with electricity imports is preferable
to the policy scenario with gas-fired power plants in
spite of its higher marginal costs, but not as much as
the difference in total system costs suggest. Policy
preferences might thus rather depend on the assess-
ment and weighting of other criteria such as domestic
and gray CO2 emissions and import dependence on
electricity versus natural gas.
Of course, we would not have these differing views if
electricity consumers paid prices based on average rather
than marginal costs. Therefore, the assumption of full
market liberalization is essential for this result. Another
important assumption is that the profits of the electricity
utilities are redistributed lump-sum to households. If
they were “wasted” or exported, the policy scenario,
which has smaller mark-ups due to higher average and
lower marginal costs, would look better. If the utilities’
profits were used by their mostly public sector owners
to reduce distortionary taxes, the reference scenario
would look even better than it does. It would also gain
from including the external costs of the gas-fired power
plants in the welfare calculations.
The simulation of scenarios with specific technology
restrictions shows that they can have large effects on
profits, which is particularly relevant with marginal cost
pricing in liberalized markets. In the scenarios and with
the cost assumptions of this paper, overall profits in
Swiss electricity generation stay positive under marginal
cost pricing, i.e., prices are high enough to cover the
capital cost of the optimized generation park. This is,
however, not a general result, and profits can turn nega-
tive when the variable costs of the marginal plant are
very low, as is the case for many renewables. Given that
our simulations bear positive profits, we do not address
the consequences of less favorable profit situations for
competitors and regulators in this paper. Anyway, with
electricity markets being further liberalized, policy-in-
duced variations in profit margins may not be over-
looked. This calls for a framework that is able to assess
the welfare impacts of the variation of electricity gener-
ation costs, wholesale prices, and sector profits, consid-
ering general equilibrium effects. In this context, the
marginal cost-based coupling approach in the framework
presented here is an important innovation.
Average and marginal costs of electricity varying in
opposite directions are specific to our case study. It is
indeed linked to the Swiss technology mix, and heav-
ily reliant on projections for the prices of electricity
and natural gas imports. If, contrary to our assump-
tions, electricity can always be imported at a lower
price than the marginal generation cost with gas-fired
power plants, then obviously, the policy scenario with
the restriction on imports and the facilitation of gas-
fired power plants is even less attractive. Our conclu-
sions are relevant for all situations where marginal
and average cost behave differently, which is likely
when the technology mix is composed of largely de-
preciated plants and marginal (new) technologies are
relatively expensive.
13With this simple view, one would plead for average cost pricing over
marginal cost pricing!
Fig. 5 Average cost and wholesale price mark-up for electricity
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